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A C T I V I S M A N D S O C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T
I N T H E M I D D L E EAST
This a r t i c l e is about social ac t iv i sm and ils re la t ionship to social development in the
Middle East. It examines the myriad strategies that the region's urban grass-roots
pursue to defend their rights and improve their lives in this neo-liberal age. Prior to
the advent of the political-economic res t ructur ing of the 1980s, most Middle Eastern
countries were largely dominated by either nationalist-populist regimes ( such as
Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Turkey) or pro-Western rentier states (Iran, Arab
Gulf states). Financed by oil or remit tances, these largely authori tar ian states pursued
state-led development strategies, attaining remarkable (21% average annual ) growth
rates.' Income from oil offered the rentier states the possibility of providing social
services to many of their citi/ens. and the ideologically driven populist states dis-
pensed signif icant benefits in education, health, employment, housing, and the like."
For these post-colonial regimes, such provision of social welfare was necessary to
build popularity among the peasants, workers, and middle strata at a t ime that these
slates were struggling against both the colonial powers and old internal rul ing classes.
The state acted as the moving force of economic and social development on behalf of
the populace.
The authoritarian nature of these states restricted meaningful political participation
and the development of effective civil-society orgam/ations. The regimes' etatist ide-
ology and patrimonial tendencies rendered the stales the mam. if not the sole, provider
ol livelihoods for many cit i /ens, in exchange for their loyalty. In etat is t models, the
state controls the bulk of the economic, political, and social domains, leaving l i t t le
space for society to develop itself anil lor interest groups to surface, compete, and act
autonomously. In the Middle East, such ideology often led to the demobilization—or,
at best, controlled mobili/alion—of certain segments of the population, as exempli-
fied by the corporatist unions under ( iamal Abdel Nasser and currently in Syria: the
state-run syndicates under the Shah of Iran: the Islamic Associations under Ayatollah
Khomeini: and the People's Councils in Libya.
The advent ol "liberali /ation" and marketi/ation through the International Monetary
Fund-sponsored Economic Reform anil Structural Adjus tment programs (ERSA) has
Asel U.iv.n is Professor. Department ol Sociology. A n u i u . m I ' l m e i s i t y in ( a i m C.uro I eypt; e-mail:
. i t u i ' L ' \ | > t edu
- '1X12 t'linihrulHi' l'nni-i\in I'n
2 A si'f Haytit
provoked important socio-economic changes. Free-market economies have made con-
sumer commodities vastly more accessible and enriched the upper socio-economic
strata while also increasing income disparities and causing critical changes in labor
markets. Informal and marginali/ed groups, such as the unemployed, casual workers,
and street subsistence laborers, have expanded. A large number of public-sector work-
ers and rural laborers, as well as educated, once well-to-do members of the middle-
class (government employees and college students), have been pushed into the ranks
of the urban poor in labor and housing markets
In the meantime, states have gradually been retreating from the social responsibili-
ties that characlen/ed their early populist development. Many social provisions have
been withdrawn, and the low-income groups largely have to rely on themselves to
survive. For instance, in Egypt, state subsidies on certain basic foodstuffs such as rice,
sugar, and cooking oil have been removed, and subsidies on items such as fuel , power,
and transportation have been reduced. Rent control is being reconsidered; a new land
law has ended tenant farmers ' control over land; and pubic-sector reform and privati-
/ation continue, all with significant social costs. From as early as 1993, a United States
Agency for International Development report was warning of the "deteriorating social
conditions in Egypt."4 Although certain social indicators such as life expectancy and
infant mortality have improved, unemployment, poverty, and income gaps reportedly
increased in the 1990s.s Similar changes are taking place in Jordan, resulting from a
series of events such as the second Gulf War, which deepened the crisis there.'1 In Iran,
the government has been vacillating between etatism and free-market policies since
1990. Compared with that in other countries in the region, the direction of economic
liberali/ation in Iran has been slow, due partly to labor resistance and partly to the
struggle among political factions. Although the Syrian economy remains predominantly
under state control, the private sector is being allowed to expand gradually.7
Concurrent with these political-economic developments have been the globali/a-
tion of the ideas of human rights and political part icipat ion, which have placed eco-
nomic rights and citi/en participation on the polit ical agenda and subsequently helped
to open new spaces lor social mobili/ation. The inabi l i ty of populist states to incorpo-
rate or suppress the new social forces (such as lower-middle and middle classes) that
they have helped to generate has led to the growth of civil-society ins t i tu t ions . When
states are unable to meet the needs of these classes, they resort to (and encourage the
establishment of) civil associations to f u l f i l l them.K Recent surveys on civi l society in
the Middle Hast suggest that , despite the authoritarian nature of many states, hum. in
rights activists, artists, writers, religious figures, and professional groups have brought
pressure to bear on the governments tor accountability and openness.'
These overall economic and social changes—notably, the deteriorating social condi-
t ions of the poor, on the one hand, and the expansion of' the public sphere and civi l
ins t i tu t ions , on the other—raise some crucial questions. How do the grass-roots in the
Middle Fast react to their changing social and economic realities? And if they indeed
confront their changing circumstance, what is the logic behind the shift in the nature
ot demands, sites of protests, and patterns of activism in the region? To what extent
is "pressure from below" required tor meaningful policy change and ins t i t u t iona l re-
form conducive to social development for defending people's livelihoods and r ights
in the Middle East? By addressing such questions, this ar t ic le attempts to explore the
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nature of grass-roots activism in the region to defend livelihoods and pursue social
development.
As a generic term, "activism" refers to any kind of human activity—individual or
collective, inst i tutional or informal—that aims to engender change in people's lives.
As an ant i thesis of passivity, "activism" includes many types of activities, ranging
from survival strategies and resistance to more sustained forms of collective action
and social movements.1" My locus on the issue of activism is a reaction partly to the
virtual absence of the people from the economic-development discourse, notably
ERSA, and partly to the dearth of scholarly work on social movement and social
development in the Middle East compared with Latin America and South Asia.
This is not to downplay some important recent works on the subject. Marsha Posus-
ney, who is working on privati/.ation and labor unions in Egypt; Unni Wikan, Diane
Singerman, and Homa Hoodfar, who have studied Cairo's poor families: and Val
Moghadam and Haleh Afshar, studying women and development have made valuable
contributions." However, the grass-roots activities described by most authors remain
broadly in the realm of s u r v i v a l strategies—activities that are carried out often at
the cost of the actors' themselves or fellow humans. For instance, cutting down on
one's consumption or working in multiple jobs may ensure survival but at the cost of
possible malnutri t ion or exhaustion.
This article shows that grass-roots activism in the Middle East is much more com-
plex, diverse, and dynamic. I discuss six types of activism expressed in urban mass
protests, trade unionism, community activism, social Islamism, nongovernmental or-
ganizations (N(i()s) , and quiet encroachment. I argue that past collective or mass
urban protests and labor unionism failed to improve the living conditions of a large
number of people. Community activism has been feeble. And social Islam and NGOs
address only sonic ot the problems. Middle Eastern societies thus foster quiet en-
croachment as a viable strategy that gives the urban grass-roots some power over their
own lives and inf luence over state policy. Quiet encroachment is characterized by
direct actions of individuals and famil ies to acquire the basic necessities of then lives
(land for shelter, urban collective consumption, informal jobs, business opportunities)
in a quiet and unassuming, illegal fashion. These prolonged and largely alomi/ed
struggles bring about significant social changes for the actors.
I conclude by highl ight ing a number of tendencies in the form and location of
grass mois mobi l i /a l ion in the region. 1 point to notable sh i f t s from class-based orga-
n iza t ions (trade unions, peasant organizations, and cooperatives) to more fragmented
activit ies positioned in the informal sector, NGOs, and social Islam; from campaigns
for monetary entitlements to struggles for citizenship; and from the expression of
demands in the workplace to their expression in communities. Because of rapid urban-
ization, cities increasingly have become sites of conflict and struggle,1" and national
struggles are increasingly assuming urban expression. Therefore, whereas numerous
movements—notably, those associated with human rights, democracy, women, and
farmers—deal wi th some aspects of social development, this article focuses on the
social activism of the urban grass-roots, an issue that is frequently overlooked. Al-
though I have attempted, at the risk of overgeneralization, to survey many countries
in the Middle East, much of the data comes from Iran and Egypt because of their rich
and varied experiences of social mobilization.
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U R B A N M A S S I ' K O l ' I - S l S
The urban riots of the 1980s were an early expression of discontent wi th sonic aspects
of neo-liberal policies in the Middle East, as various countries tried to reduce their
deficits through austerity policies, such as cuts in consumer subsidies. These reduc-
tions violated the social contract between Ihe stales and the masses, triggering anger
and discontent. Although it is difficult to determine the precise profile of the partici-
pants, the urban middle and lower classes were among the main actors. In August
1983, the Moroccan government reduced consumer subsidies by 20 percent. Even
though public-sector salaries were raised by an equal amount, riots broke out in north-
ern Morocco and other regions. Similar riots occurred in Tunis in 1984 (89 kil led)
and in Khartoum in 1982 and 1985 (number of dead unknown). In the summer of
1987, Lebanese involved in the civil war got together to stage a massive demonstration
in Beirut against the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound. Algeria was struck by
cost-of-living riots in the fal l of 1988, and Jordan experienced s imilar violence in
1989." This l ist excludes many political protests that raised issues concerning indiv id-
ual freedoms, regional autonomy, and professional matters (e.g., al Egypt's Mi l i t a ry
Academy in 1986 and in the Iranian cities of Tabri/ and Qa/.vin and, more recently,
among students in 1999).
Despite the acceleration of neo-liberal policies, urban mass protests ebbed notice-
ably during the 1990s. Several factors played a part. Alarmed by the earlier unrest,
governments imposed tighter controls while delaying or implementing unpopular poli-
cies only gradually. Aside from in te rna t iona l ly sponsored safety nets, such as the
Social Fund for Development as in Egypt and Jordan, add i t i ona l out le ts were offered
by the growth of welfare NGOs and social Islam.
The experience of the Islamic Revolut ion and the war with Iraq distinguished Iran
from its regional counterparts. While many regimes in the Middle East were shedding
their populism during the 1980s and 1990s, Iran began to experience that only after
the revolution. The Islamic regime's rhetoric in favor of the downtrodden (inustazajm)
contributed to the mobil i /a t ion of the grass-roots. The war suppressed internal dissent:
once it ended, a new opportunity for collective activities, such as urban mass protests,
arose. Thus, un l ike the relat ively quiet 1980s, six major protests took place in Tehran
and other Iranian cities in the early 1990s. Riots in Tehran in August 1991 and in
5 h ira/ and Arak in 1992 were carried out by squatters because of demolition of their
shelters or forced evictions. Even more dramatic unrest took place in the city Mashad
in 1992 and Tehran's Islamshahr community in 1995. In Mashad, the protests were
triggered by the munic ipal i ty ' s rejection of demands by city squatters to legali/,e their
communities. This massive unrest, on which the army failed to clamp down, le f t more
than one hundred buildings and stores destroyed, three hundred people arrested, and
more than a do/en people dead. The three-day riots in Islamshahr. a large informal
community in South Tehran, in April 1995 had to do with the postwar economic
austerity—notably, increases in bus fare and the price of fuel—under President Ha-
shemi Rafsanjuni.
Urban protests in the Middle East have had mixed results. Following immediate
repression, governments in many eases have had to revoke unpopular measures (as in
Egypt in 1977, Tunisia and Morocco in 1984, Sudan in 1985, Algeria in 1988, Jordan
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in 1989, and Iran on many occasions). Al times, they have made tactical concessions,
such as increasing wages; this, however, affects only wage-earners at the expense of
the self-employed poor and the unemployed.14 Where the protests arc local or small-
scale, the governments usually have managed to end them by force. Workers in Kafr
al-Dawwar in Egypt managed to f u l f i l l only part of their demands. The Egyptian
tanners' protests in 1998 across isolated villages Tailed to modify the new policy that
ended tenant farmers' long-term control over land. However, when social protests
have gained national support by embracing diverse issues and actors (such as students
and the middle classes making economic as well as political claims), they often pro-
voke s igni f icant changes, inc lud ing political reform (as in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia,
and Turkey in the late 1980s).
Despite their drama and, at times, their remarkable impact, urban mass protests are
usual ly spontaneous, ad hoc, and consequently uncommon; they often involve vio-
lence and a risk of repression. Urban riots are a response to the absence of effective
insti tutionalized mechanisms of confl ict resolution. The social groups wi thout i n s t i t u -
tionally based power to disrupt (such as the unemployed, who cannot strike) and those
who enjoy such power but find it inadequate (workers, students) are l ikely to follow
leaders in initiating mass protests. This is not to say, as some have claimed, that
Middle Eastern masses essentially lack a "truly collective life," resorting instead to
"mob action."1 For in favorable conditions, they also engage in modern forms of
collective action—notably, trade unionism.
T R A D E U N I O N I S M
Trade unionism represents an older and sustained i n s t i t u t i o n through which working
people have defended their rights or exerted pressure on economic elites and govern-
ments to bring about social change. Trade unions have the potential to respond rapidly
and systematically to unjust labor practices, d i s t r i b u t i v e issues, and polit ical matters.
At the same time, they are most affected by the current neo-liberal economic policies,
which often result in new labor discipline and redundancies.
Originally, trade un ions in the Middle East emerged in the context of European
colonial domination. Their struggles, therefore, involved both class and nationalist
dimensions—usually a tense strategic position. At independence, most trade-union
organi/ations were integrated into the state structure or the ruling parties, resulting in
the current s i tuat ion, in which unitary, compulsory unions make up the majority of
labor organi/ations. This type of union, in which public-sector workers constitute the
core members, operates in countries with populist pasts (such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq,
Libya, and Syria) as well as in Kuwait and Yemen. The Arab Gulf states, using mostly
foreign workers, impose tough discipline and disallow labor organi/ations in exchange
for relatively high pay. Surveillance, however, has not prevented occasional outbreaks
of labor unrest, such as the Palestinian workers' strike in the Saudi oil industry in
1980s and the riots of Egyptian workers in Kuwait against discrimination in October
1999. h Only Jordan, Lebanon. Morocco, and Turkey have p l u r a l i s t unions that are
relatively independent from the state or rul ing parties.
Union structure affects workers' ability to maintain their gains or advance them.
Independent unions, more than corporalist ones, are l ike ly to defend workers' rights.
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However, in the experience of the region, workers tend to use the existing, corporatist
organizations to further their own interests, as is shown in the s la te- controlled Workers
Syndicates before the Iranian Revolution and Workers' Shuras and the Union of Un-
employed Workers after.17 This applies also to the corporatist trade unions in Egypt
established by Nasser following the liberal era (1928-52), when labor unions enjoyed
a period of relative independence.18
Currently, organi/ed public-sector workers, more than any other group, feel the
immediate consequences of economic adjustment. Thus, trade unions are concerned
with and often struggle against cuts in consumer subsidies, price rises, reductions in
wages and allowances, layoffs, and government interference in union affairs. A hu-
man-rights organisation reported seventy strikes against large companies in Egypt
during 1998, most of which involved state security forces. The main cause of the
industrial actions was "government reform policy."1'' The Egyptian press, citing offi-
cial statements, reported in early 1999 the occurrence of more than l ive strikes and
sit-ins per week. These actions resulted largely from reductions in allowances and
perquisites and the introduction of fines. " In Iran, the 1990s saw a rapid increase in
worker strikes. During the first half of 1991 some 2,000 strikes were reported.21
According to one account, strikes by workers trying to catch up with inflation were
so common that the authorities hardly noticed them." New labor laws, redrafted to
accord with the neo-liberal era and economic realities, have been hotly contested,
because they often strip workers of several traditional rights—notably, job security.
In Egypt, the labor unions compelled government and business to accept in 1994 an
exchange of "the right to strike for the right to fire." ' In Iran, labor law remained a
mailer of dispute between the ruling clergy and pro-labor forces for more than a
decade.
Some observers tend to underestimate the capacity of organi/ed labor in the Middle
East to affect social and political developments on the grounds that strikes, the work-
ers' major weapon, are illegal and often involve the risk of arrest and imprisonment.
In addition, they argue, states usually co-opt the leaderships of these largely corporat-
ist labor unions, thus rendering union activism practically ineffective.24 It is true that
strikes are i l legal , and labor leaders may be bought off, wi th many of them becoming
part of the ruling parties and the state bureaucracy. However, Posusney rightly argues
that "labor has been able to pursue economic demands and wring concessions from
Ihe state, in spite of corporatist controls," and its ab i l i ty to do so "is contingent on
the specific issue at hand and how policy around that issue is made."2S The fact is that
even the corporatist leadership must be somehow responsive to the views and con-
cerns of i t s rank and file. Not only do labor leaders often express opposition lo certain
government policies (e.g., removal ol subsidies, privatisation, aspects of labor law),
but the rank and file tend to wage unofficial industrial action when the leadership fails
to lake the ini t iat ive. In Egypt, for instance, opposition by organised labor has been
Ihe main cause of delays in the implementation or renegotiation of terms of adjustment
with the IMF both currently and under previous government.26
Notwithstanding its social and political impact, organised labor in the Middle East
has continued to comprise only a small portion of the total workforce. The vast major-
ity have been self-employed, with a large fraction of wage-earners working in small
workshops in which paternalistic labor relations prevail. Although tension between
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bosses and employees is not uncommon in these establishments, laborers are more
likely to remain loyal to their bosses t han to ally with their colleagues in the shop
next door. On the whole, between one-third and one-halt' of the workforce in the cit ies
(Egypt. 4V/,; Iran. 3.V/r ; Turkey. ,W/< ; Yemen Arab Republic. 1()7< ) are active in the
mlormal sector, and thus remain iinorgani/.ed and beyond the provisions of labor law. 7
The economic restructuring of the 1980s has further undermined organi/.ed labor,
as the public sector, the core of trade unionism, is shrinking because of closures,
downsi/ing. and early retirements. Numerous reports point to the declining capacity
of the region's labor movements to mobili/.e. Organized labor in Egypt, Lebanon,
Morocco. Tunisia, and Iran is described as "disjointed." "defensive." "decapitated and
de-proletariani/ed."2" Labor is becoming more informal and fragmented, with less or
no protection, and dispersed across vast arrays of activities and spaces among the
unemployed, casual workers, and domestic labor, in the small workshops, and on
street corners."'
( ( I M M U N I T Y A C T I V I S M
For the urban grass-roots, then, urban community or neighborhood may offer a sense
of common identity and a ground for collective action in the stead of the workplace
For in the neighborhoods, most face the same diff icul t ies in ensuring secure housing,
paying rent, and acquiring access to urban amenities, schools, clinics, cultural centers,
and the like. Community-based collective struggles for such "collective consumption"
through institutional settings is what in a sense characteri/.es the urban social move-
ments. This kind of community a c t i v i s m , often contentious, should be distinguished
from the notion of "community development." The latter has had a double effect of
both main ta in ing the status quo and engendering social change. Indeed, the program
of community development in the West was originally aimed at counter-insurgency
against communism (in the colonies), containment of discontent among the black
underclass (in the United States), and management of the poor by providing commu-
nity solutions (in the United Kingdom)." Yet community development may also open
space to cult ivate resistance against the e l i tes and foster social change. This is often
the case when the grass-roots i n i t i a l e development on their own or are mobili/ed by
local leaders, NGOs, religious groups, or politicians (as in Bra/ihan barrios or Self-
Employed Women's Association in India) . Here mobili/.ution may not necessarily be
contentious; it could express cooperative community engagement whereby people
work together to improve their lives and communities with a degree of control over
decisions and then outcome. How do the Middle Eastern cities ('are in terms of such
community activism?
In recent years, a number of community mobilizations took place in Middle Eastern
ci t ies t h a t bore some resemblance to urban social movements. Take, for instance, the
i ampaign of the people of E/bal Mekawy, a low-income community in Cairo, against
indus t r i a l pollut ion in the area where smelters had caused major hea l th and environ-
mental problems." They used t rad i t iona l strategies of communication wi th in the com-
munity, as well as modern tactics such as engaging the media, lobbying pol i t ic ians .
and resorting to the court system as a means of registering opposition. In a different
example , members of the Shubra a l -Khaima community in Egypt rapidly responded
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to a governorate's plan in August 1994 to demolish an unauthori/cd suction of a
community complex (a mosque, a c l ime, and a pharmacy) that had taken inhabi tan ts
ten years to build with their own money.'"
At certain periods — notably, when states become more vulnerable — even more en-
during and large-scale mobili /ation develops. The collapse of the state during the
Lebanese civil war caused community mobi l i /a l ion in the Mus l im south, where its
i n s t i t u t i o n s continue to this day. Thousands I roni the south moved to the southern
suburb (tliilinn) of Beirut, building illegal settlements that currently make up 40 per-
cent of the homes in the area. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990,
networks ot volunteer and associational groups played a vital role not only in support-
ing civi l disobedience, but also in f i l l i n g the v a c u u m created by loss ot munic ipa l
services." The Palestinian Popular Organi/ations acted as the main organs of social
provisioning and development in the Occupied Territories both dur ing the In t i fada
and after.14 Immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, many poor famil ies took
over hundreds of vacant homes and half-finished apartment blocks, refurbishing them
us their own properties and establ ishing apartment councils to manage them collec-
tively. In the meantime, land takeovers and illegal construction accelerated. With the
help of local and outside mobih/.ers, squatters got together and demanded electricity
and running water; when they were refused or encountered delays, they acquired them
illegal ly. They established roads, opened clinics and stores, constructed mosques and
libraries, and organi/ed refuse collection. They further set up associations and com-
m u n i t y networks and participated in local consumer cooperatives. A new and a more
autonomous way of l iv ing, functioning, and organi/ing community was in the making.
However, when compared with some Latin American countries, these experiences
seem acutely uncommon. They tend to happen in extraordinary social and political
circumstances — in revolutionary conditions or in times of cr is is and war, when the
state is undermined or totally absent, as in Palestine. Thus, tew such ac t iv i t i e s become
a pattern lor sustained social mobi l i / a t ion and inst i tut ional i /a t ion in normal s i t u a t i o n s
Once the exceptional conditions come to an end, the experiments begin to wither
away or get distorted. In Iran, community activism did not get a chance to consolidate
itself . Lack of experience, rivalry of outside mobili/ers and polit ical groups, and espe-
c ia l ly the hos t i l i ty of the government seriously undermined the experiment. Instead,
Mosque Associations were established not only to offer the locals assistance in distrib-
uting basic necessities such as food during the war with Iraq; they served also to
control political discontent in the neighborhoods. They resembled the 3,000 Commu-
nity Development Associations (CDAs) that current ly operate throughout Egypt. " Al-
though CDAs contribute to the poor's social wel l -being, the i r mobi l i / ing impact is
minimal . As a f ield researcher working in a popular quarter of Cairo stated: "Even in
the highly politici/ed Sayyeda Zeinah, organi/.ed social action tha t involves the area's
inhabitants seems minimal. The residents' role is usually limited to that of beneficiar-
ies of whatever services . . . are available.""
Needless to say, urban communities are not b lank spots devoid of social interaction.
Surely, they are more than small villages subject to i n d i v i d u a l i s m , anonymity, and
competition. Nevertheless, they contain numerous torms of networks and i n s t i t u t i o n s .
In the modern city of Tehran, neighborly relations, according to a recent study, stil l
prevail; members participate in assist ing one another, pay vis i ts , consult , and take part
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.in weddings and funerals. In Egyptian cities. Migrant Associations have institutional-
ized some of these funct ions; funeral activities and maintaining cemeteries for the
people from "home villages" are their main activity.18 I n f luen t i a l individuals may take
advantage of the state-controlled neighborhood councils (nnijali\ al-mahalliyyah,
\linra-\i nuihallat). But the informal credit systems (such as the jtinui'nat in Egypt
and sanduq-i qur: al-hasanili in I ran) serve as perhaps the most important form of
community network in urban centers.
Social networks tha t extend beyond kinship and ethnicity remain largely casual,
unstructured, and paternalistic. The weakness of civic or non-kinship cooperation at
the community level only reinforces tradit ional hierarchical and paternalistic relations
with people depending on local leaders (kihâr, shaykhs, Friday prayer leaders), prob-
lem-solvers, and even local bullies (lût* or hallajiyya) rather than on broad-based
social activism. In such social conditions, the modern ins t i tu t ions such as political-
party branches, local N(i()s. or police are susceptible to clientism. Thus, while the
Egyptian lower classes, for instance, are aware of environmental problems, they un-
dertake l i t t l e in the way of collective action, ei ther through communal engagement to
upgrade the community itself or through protest actions to demand that off ic ia ls do
this for them.w
Why is community activism, a social action tor collective consumption, relatively
uncommon in the Middle East? Why is the region a "blank space" in the global map
of community action, as some observers have put it?4"
One reason has to do with the legacy of populism, which continues to influence
the political behavior of the ordinary people in most Middle Eastern countries. Popu-
list regimes established a social contract between the lower and middle classes and
tin.- state, whereby the state agreed to provide the basic necessities in exchange tor
the i r support, social peace, and consequently demobilization, or just a controlled mo-
bih/at ion. This was not an agreement between the state and independent classes.
Rather, it was an agreement between the state and a shapeless mass, an aggregate of
individuals and corporate ins t i tu t ions in which independent collective identity and
action were seriously undermined. Although distributive populism is currently waning
and market forces are escalating, many people still tend to look at the states as the
m.un source of protection as well as misfortune. In countries where authoritarian
populism still predominates (such as Iran in the 1980s, Libya, and Syria), the states-
men's dread of the public sphere has given a structure to the regimes that in some
ways incarcerate the entire population.
This legacy has also contributed to the tendency among many ordinary people to
seek i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c solutions to their problems." More often than not. famil ies of
different social strata tend to compete when resources are scarce. This occurs even
more often in the new and heterogeneous communities (such as Dar Essalaam. Madi-
nat al-Nahda. and Kafr Seif in Cairo, and Islamshahr and Khak-i Safid in Tehran)
than in the old city quarters, where the relative homogeneity of inhab i tan t s and the
longevity of residence have produced a spatial identity. The coexistence of identifiable
strata in a community—such as old-timers and newcomers, those with and without
security of tenure, and different ethnic groups—often sharpens the existing competi-
tion, leading to conflicts.43 Consequently, with solidarity intangible among the people,
recourse to the mighty state—this provider and punisher—becomes an alternative
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way to achieve their goals. Many of them know, however, that the bureaucracy is
unable or unwi l l i ng to respond formally to the growing demands of the urban poor,
and they tend to seek informal, individualistic, and even opportunistic ways to culti-
vate wasta or puni (connection) or bribe the officials. "The best way to get whatever
you want done," said a resident of the Sayyida Zeinab district of Cairo, "is to pay a
bribe to any of the assis tants of any of the area's big politicians and they w i l l do for
you whatever you want."4
A key contributor to such social response is the lack of a structure of opportunity
for mobili/ation. The advent of neo-liberal economies in the Middle East has not
accompanied a sufficiently democratic polity.44 Put simply, most governments in the
region are s t i l l apprehensive of and tend to restrict independent collective mobil i /at ion
tor fear ol losing poli t ical space. In many states, public demonstrations and gatherings
are largely i l legal . As a street vendor in Cairo's Madinal al-Nahda invoking Egypt's
Emergency Law said: "If I call my neighboring street vendor to get together and do
something collectively, this would be called mobil i /at ion, and I could be taken in for
that."4S A human-r ights agency's account of fanners' protests in twenty-five villages
against the new land law in Egypt in the course of eight months reported f i f t e e n
deaths, 218 injuries, and 822 arrests."'
Alternatively, the governments may allow popular ini t ia t ive in order to control it.
Where it succeeds in doing so, the popular classes lend to lose interest, w i th the result
that their activism fails to sustain i t s e l f . Because the supporting environment is lack-
ing, they fail to experiment and learn new ways of doing things. Thus, most of the
genuine popular i n s t i t u t i o n s transform into the extension of the states.
Political democracy is instrumental in another way. In a truly competitive polity,
political forces are compelled to bargain with and thus mobili/e the grass-roots to win
their electoral support. This is how the urban poor in Iran became the subject of an
intense competition between the ruling clergy and various oppositioiuil groups in the
early 1980s. Similar ly , a sustained competitive system in Turkey allowed the I s l amis t
Rifah Party (RP) to mobili/e the urban masses in the twenty-six municipali t ies it
controlled, thereby giving the electorate strong bargaining power. Manipulative elec-
toral practices in Egypt, however, tend to l imi t the oppositional parties to restricted
local campaigns, as in E/bet Mikawy described earlier.
f i n a l l y , collective patronage may also lead unintent ional ly to social and political
mobili/ation when patrons bargain w i t h thei r poor c l ien ts ' leaders in thei r quest lor
personal and political power. Mobili/ation of street vendors in Mexico C' i ty through
negotiation between the vendors' union leaders and poli t icians is partly the result of
this type of political patronage.47 In much of the Middle East (except in Lebanon and
in the case of Is tanbul 's street car-parkers' "mafia"), however, patronage seems to
work more through individual channels and rarely leads to group activities. Favors are
granted to individuals or families (in getting the security of tenure or jobs, for in-
stance) than groups who then can bargain with their patron in exchange for his
support.
In brief, community ac t iv i sm in the form of urban social movements seems to be
largely a Latin American model rooted in socio-political conditions of that region
(although it can be found in South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in India). The likes
of local soup kitchens, neighborhood associations, church groups, and street trade
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unionism are hardly common features in the Middle East. The prevalence of authori-
tarian states and the legacy of populism, together with the strength of family and
k i n s h i p ties in this region, render primary solidarities more pertinent than secondary
associations and social movements.
I S L A M I S T M O V I - M L M I S A N D S O C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T
Some observers view the current Islamist movements in the region as the Middle
hastern model of urban social movements. In this vision, Islamism—in particular,
"social Islam"—articulates the concerns and struggles of the underprivileged urban
Middle Easterners. For many, the seemingly disadvantaged background of the radical
Is lamis ts is indicative of the nature of the movements. Others look at the locations of
their activities, in poor areas, to arrive at similar conclusion.48
No doubt, Islamist movements—notably, "social Islam"—represent a significant
means through which some disadvantaged groups survive hardship or better their
lives. The Is lamis t movements contribute to social welfare first by directly providing
services such as health care, education, and financial aid; at the same time, they offer
involvement in community development and a social network, most of which are
carried out through local, nongovernmental, mosques. Second, the Islamist move-
ments tend to foster social competition wherein other religious and secular organiza-
tions are compelled to become involved in community work. Finally, the governments,
in order to outmaneuver the Is lamis ts and regain legitimacy, are often forced to imple-
ment social policies in favor of the poor.
Although Islamic social-welfare has a long history in the Middle Hast, it has multi-
plied and taken on new forms in recent decades. During the recent growth of Islamism
in Turkey in the 1980s, "mosques and their attendant religious associations repre-
sented direct channels of neighborhood orguni/.ation and recruitment."4'' The Is lamis t
RP continued in the 1990s to focus on grass roots community issues—"garbage, pot-
holes and mud." Many RP mayoral candidates even distributed in-kind incentives to
secure support. This grass-roots strategy led to the party's massive victory in the
1994 elections, capturing 327 municipalities throughout Turkey, including Ankara and
Istanbul . Mayors have boasted in successfully addressing the problems of congested
transportation, water and fuel shortage, inadequate housing, pollution, corruption, and
the like."" Similarly, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of different Islamist
parties in Algeria, prevailed in municipal elections in June 1990 in a very similar
fashion. When the National Liberation Front allowed mult ipar ty system in 1989, FIS
activists began to work wi th in the existing Charity Associations (mosque-centered
networks) that had been established in the 1980s by religious activists. Supported by
the Charity Associations, the FIS took its political ideas into the neighborhoods.""'
In a qui te different context. Hi /bul lah filled the vacuum created by the absence of
the state in southern Lebanon to construct the infrastructure for social development.
During the 1980s, Hi/bullah began gradually to address social problems faced by the
Shi'i community. It developed plans to offer medical care, hospital treatment, electric-
ity, and water trucking. It also paved roads, bui l t housing, managed sewage systems,
set up gas stations, and operated schools, nurseries, hospitals, and sports centers." It
provided 130.000 scholarships, aid for 135,000 needy families, and interest-free loans.
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Repairing war-damaged houses and a t t end ing to daily needs of ' the population in areas
of Shi'i concentration were priority areas of intervention.S i
Egypt's social I s lam has become perhaps the most pervasive phenomenon in the
region. The Islamic associations, often centered in tihli mosques ( h u i l t and controlled
by the people rather than the state) grew extensively in pan because the government's
development programs had fallen into crisis in the past two decades. They accounted
for one-third of all Egyptian private voluntary organi/ations (PVOs) in the late l9S()s,
and at least .50 percent of all welfare associations (or 6,327) in the late 1990s,54 offer-
ing charity and health services to mill ions. Today, more than 4,000 /.akat (rel igious
t a x ) Committees organized in mosques mediate between the donors and the needy.
Some estimates put the number of beneficiaries of the Islamic welfare (heal th) ser-
vices at 15 million people (in 1992), as opposed to 4.5 mi l l ion in 1980." Indeed,
the mosques came to provide alternative support services to low-income groups to
compensate for the government's withdrawal of support after adopting more liberal
economic policies. One typical association, the Ansar al-Muhammadiya Association
in the poor community of Imhaba, b u i l t a mosque and two schools and provided day
care, medical treatment and an elaborate welfare program.56 Others offered video
clubs, computer-training centers, and similar services to cater to the needs of such
groups as the high-school graduates who are the potential recruits of the radical politi-
cal Islamists. Contrary to the common perception, radical Islamists such as al-Gama'a
al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad, were far less involved in urban community work. As rural
and urban guerrillas, their strategy centered on armed attacks, targeting the state offi-
cials, police, and tourism. Nevertheless, where possible, they combined their political
agitation with some welfare activities, as they did in such poor quarters of Cairo as
Ain al-Shams and Imbaba.57
What makes all of these activities "Islamic" is the combination of an alternative to
both the state and the private sector, the religious conviction of many of their activists,
Islamic-based funding, and, finally, the provision of affordable social services. It is
widely agreed that such Islamic community activities often outdo their secular coun-
terparts. The avai lab i l i ty of funding in the form of /akat (2.5'/( of income) from
Musl im businesses and activists, \culaqat (various donations), klutinx (a f i f th ) levied
on the savings of Shi'i Muslims, and external aid (e.g., from Iran io He/.bollah and
from Saudi Arabia to the FIS) render these associations comparatively advantageous.
In the early 1990s, the Nasser Bank, which supervises the /akat Committees in Egypt,
reported a $10 mi l l i on /akat fund." The addit ional advantages include the spirit of
voluntarism, as well as legal favor. That is, unl ike secular NGOs, which have to
surmount many bureaucratic hurdles to raise funds, the religious PVOs tend to get
around the law by obtaining donations and other contributions from Musl im believers
in places of worship.'**
The grass-roots activities of the Islamists, in the meantime, compelled other social
forces to enter into the competition hoping to share th is political space. The Turkish
tariqu* (religious orders) emulated one another in community activities through
mosques and their attendant associations."1 AI-A/har, the p i l l a r of establishment Islam
in Egypt, began to o f f e r s imi la r social services to the needy in competition with the
Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Similarly, secular groups—notably,
secular NGOs—seem to work hard to offer their own piecemeal alternatives. An esti-
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mated 5 m i l l i o n poor benefited from the health, educational, financial, and community
services of Egyptian PVOs in I WO." In addition, the governments were affected, as
they feared losing the political ini t ia t ive to the Is lamists . The Egyptian government's
measures to upgrade slums and squatter areas in the early 1990s clearly reflected the
inf luence ol Imhaha, the slum community in Cairo in which by 1992 mil i tant I s lamis t s
had created, according to foreign media, "a state within the stale.""
Given these ac t iv i t i es . 10 what extent does Islamism represent a Middle Eastern
model of urban social movements. ' To what degree does Is lamism embody grass-roots
activism in communit ies or work collectives? How far do the I s lamis t s encourage the
grass-roots to part ic ipate in (hei r own affairs, to defend and extend their social rights'.'
I suggest Iha l a l though Is lamism, notwithstanding its variations, may be considered a
form of social movement, it does not express an urban social movement. The identity
of Is lamism does not den\e from ils part icular concern for the urban disfranchised. It
has n e v e r a r t i c u l a t e d a v is ion of an alternative urban order around which to mobil i /e
the community members, whom the Islamists see as deserving welfare recipients, to
be guided by leaders. The members are rarely expected to participate actively in
making their communities.
The Islamist movements have more extensive aims than simply focusing on the
disfranchised, a l though many ac t iv i s t s work through the poor communities to pursue
broader objectives. Not all , however, operate even in this fashion. For example, in
Iran before the revolution, neither the clergy nor non-clerical Is lamis ts , such as Ali
Shariati. were particularly interesled in mobil i / ing the poor; nor did the poor take an
active part in the Islamic Revolution. The mobilization of the urban grass-roots by
the ruling clergy in Iran began mainly after the revolution. The clergy lent its support
to the poor through the rhetoric of the iiiii\ta:'a/ïn (downtrodden), first, to offset the
stands in favor of the lower class taken by the left and the Mujaheddin, and second,
to win over the poor as their social basis in their struggles agains t the le f t , liberals,
and the remnants of ancien regime. The honeymoon between the poor and the ruling
clergy was over when the poor were polari/ed. A segment was integrated into the
state structure as members of the revolutionary institutions, such as Revolutionary
Guards, Const ruct ion Crusade, and the l ike ; others remained outside, and t h e i r strug-
gles for development brought them into confrontation with the regime.
The Lebanese He/bollah, with its law-enforcement apparatus, fe l l somewhere be-
tween a social movement and a quasi-state. Among other things. He/bollah con-
structed an in f r a s t ruc tu re of social development, but few of these services were free.'"
Currently, the He/bol lah and Amal movements control the poor suburban municipali-
t ies of South Beirut. Although they use the United Nations Development Program
discourse ol pa r t i c ipa t ion and mobili / .at ion, the i r attitudes toward the local people
remain paternalistic. They often select (not elect) people to municipali ty councils and
cooperate wi th those NGOs which are closer to them.'14 However, alongside their mo-
bi l i /a t ion of the grass roots. Turkey's Rl' and Algeria's HIS adopted exclusivist and
divisive measures. The RP-dominated municipalities practiced nepotism and patron-
age, laid off secular employees in favor of religious ones, favored contractors who
donated money to the party, and overlooked illegal real-estate construction in ex-
change for donations. The RP's policy of "cultural purification" tended to divide com-
munities.' ' Taking a similarly exclusionary stand, Egypt's al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya in
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Imbaha forced women to veil themselves, burned video shops and hairdrcssmg salons,
and beat men who drank alcohol. The Christian residents turned fearful and insecure.
While organi/ed labor generally has remained out of the Islamists' reach, the rela-
t ionship between the Islamists and the urban poor has been complex. For insiance,
contrary to common perception, Is lamic social-welfare organizations in Kgypt are not
sites of Is lamis t political activity. They simply act as service organi/ations. The vasi
majority have no link to poli t ical Islam as such. Only a few were affiliated with the
Muslim Brotherhood and a mere handful with the radical Islamists , notably al-Gama'a
al-Islamiyya. The rest operate on the basis of humanitarian commitment or simple
business rationale in a country where the market for "Islamic" commodities ( Islamic-
fashion, hooks, education, and entertainment) has been thriving. The explicit political
stance emerged in the welfare associations not in the poor areas, but in the middle-
class neighborhoods and among professional associations of doctors, engineers, and
lawyers who were allied wi th the Musl im Brotherhood.'* However, the spread of Is-
lamic services and commodities is not restricted to the poor neighborhoods or exclu-
sively to Muslims. It extends to middle-class and a f f l u e n t distr icts and to the Christian
community. The Islamic schools are not free of charge but private ins t i tu t ions that
virtually exclude the poor. In the Imbaba s lum, tor instance, only a fraction were
admitted free of charge.''7 The Is lamic schools are geared largely toward the well-to-
do, urban middle classes.
Although it has links to diverse classes. Is lamism in the Middle Hast is primarily a
movement not of the disfranchised but of the marginali/ed middle classes. Middle-
class agitators in turn tend to activate the youth and the educated unemployed, as well
as the socially well-to-do and politically marginali/ed groups. Il is these groups that
are considered the main agents of social change. Activities among the poor are largely
limited to the provision of social services, often charity, and mobi l i /a t ion during elec-
tions in which free balloting takes place. In exchange, the Muslim poor in the cities
approach the Islamists in pragmatic terms. Many of those who have no direct interac-
tion with the Islamists remain confused as to their intentions. Others who benefit
from their activities appear both appreciative and apprehensive. There is no evidence
suggesting that the urban poor as a whole have offered an ideological allegiance to
the Islamists or to the governments that have fought against the Is lamis ts Islamist
movements, therefore, are distinct from Latin American Liberation Theology. The
strategic objective of the Liberation Theology has been the "liberation of the poor";
the interpretation of (iospel follows from this point of departure.6* The Islamist move-
ments, however, generally have broader social and political objectives (e.g., an Is lamic
slate, law, and morality) than simply the mustat'afin, and secular issues such as social
just ice for the poor follow only from the establishment of Islamic order—the most
noble objective.''9 In addition, what most Is lamis ts share is a particular moral vision
of society, which is repressive in terms of gender relations and intolerant of religious
minori t ies and modern-secular forces with a stake in building a non-religious demo-
cratic poli ty. Ideological monopolies disrupt the process of plural is t democratization
and frustrate the truly participatory culture that is essential for a sustained social
development. But does the vision behind non-religious NCïOs offer a more viable
alternative for such development.'
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I U K POLITICS OF TH1 N C O S
The remarkable expansion of the Islamic welfare associations in the 1980s and 1990s
is as much a reflection of the trend toward Islami/ution as of the explosive growth of
NGOs in the Middle East in general. The notable gathering in Cairo in May 1997 of
some 700 NGO delegates from almost all of the Arab countries to follow up their
discussions during the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development
marks the growing significance attached to this sector.
Associalional l i fe is not new in the Middle Hast. Many countries in the region
have a long history of philanthropic ac t iv i t i es . Early-19th-century associations were
religious, drawing either on the Islamic notions of /akat and Mitliu/i<li or the Christian
value of charity. They were followed in the early 2()th century by largely secular
welfare and charitable associations, some of which were also used to cover anti-
colonial campaigns. Many of the welfare associations were run mainly by women of
aristocratic families who, through work in such associations, aimed to play a role in
the public sphere, a domain occupied almost exclusively by men. Although the legacy
of such associationul culture has continued to the present, the recent NGOs are of a
different breed and follow a different logic.
There are currently some 15,000 registered NGOs in Egypt, double the number that
existed in 1977. By comparison, Tunisia has 5,000 NGOs, of which 10 percent are
charity-based. Lebanon's NGOs grew from 1,586 in 1990 to more than 3,500 by 1996,
in a population of 3 million; Jordan's NGOs have increased from 112 in 1980 to 800
today. The Palestinian Indigenous Ahli Organizations (lAOs) increased from 1,000
(including 800 in the Occupied Territories and some 200 in Israel) in the early 1990s
to 1,800 today. (A number of them were registered with either Israeli or Jordanian
authorities. But perhaps the more important ones, known as "mass-based organiza-
tions" were largely unregistered.) With regard to Iran, some accounts put the number
of NGOs as high as 15,000. However, this is likely to be an exaggerated figure.
During the 1980s, in the course of the war with Iraq, many informal people's associa-
t ions were set up. Yet because of the predominance of populism and Iran's "closed-
door" policy, the country's record of development NGOs is insignif icant when com-
pared with that of other Middle Eastern countries. Many relief and welfare activities
in Iran are carried out by governmental or governmental-nongovernmental organiza-
tions—notably, the Imam's Relief Committee, the Foundation of Martyrs, the Con-
struction Crusade, the Housing Foundation, and the Volunteer Women's Community
Health Workers' Organization. However, since the late 1990s, a new trend has arisen
toward sett ing up professional, women's health, and environmental NGOs. The Net-
work of Women's NGOs currently includes 58-100 organizations, for instance. The
new th ink ing , in era of President Muhamad Khatami, is that the local councils should
he turned into the locus of popular participation, while the NGOs, currently number-
ing about 2,500, should he in charge of delivering services and charity. "
NGOs in the region fall into four general types in terms of their rationale or the
impetus behind their activities. The religiously motivated associations are organized
by mosques and Islamic figures or by churches and Christian institutions. They are
inspired by religious obligations or religious-political (actors. Classical welfare as-
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sociations, run mostly by upper-class (umil ies , have now incorporated some develop
mental (unct ions, such as income-generation, t ra in ing, and community upgrading. Pro-
fessional NGOs are managed largely by upper-middle-class professionals and, ut
times, by development experts who are driven by their t r a i n i n g and human i s t i c urge
or s imply by m a t e r i a l se l l - in te res t . And, f ina l ly , there are a host of si ale sponsored
"NGOs," such us the Egyptian Community Development Associations and the Iranian
Foundation of Dispossessed. These groups remain, in effect, an extension of the state.
Put together, these NGOs are active in diverse fields of human rights, women's issues,
welfare, culture, business, and development. Here I w i l l locus on welfare und develop-
ment NGOs thai target disadvantaged groups.
Several factors have contributed to the spectacular growth of the NGOs. Eirst, as
elsewhere, there was a need in the region's poorer countries (such as Egypt, Jordan,
und Tunisia) to f i l l the gap left by the states' inabi l i ty and unwil l ingness to face the
challenge ol social development f o l l owing the implementation of neo-liheral policies.
Population growth and urban migration had already placed a heavy pressure on urban
social services. Where a state was absent or defunct, as in Lebanon and Palestine,
orguni/ed self-help f i l led the vacuum. The second factor is the f low of foreign fund ing
resulting from new donor policies that extend uid lurgely to NGOs rather than to
individual states External funding not only encouraged the establishment of NGOs;
it o f t en influenced their activities. When there was money for human-r ights activit ies,
tor example, human-rights orguni/.utions were established. Third, there seems to be a
unique consensus along the political spectrum—among neo-liberals, the World Bank,
governments, and liberal and radical opposition groups—in support of the NGOs. The
conservatives want to shift the burden of social provisions f rom the state to indiv idu-
als . I-or ihem, NGOs act as a safety net to o f f se t the possibi l i ty of social unrest caused
by the repercussions of neo-liberal policies. In the view of Prince Talal 'Abd al-'A/i/
Al-Suud of Saudi Arabia, "NGOs are the central component of development." Accord-
ing to a prominent Arab NGO advocute, "NGOs have replaced class struggle and
socialism."71 Middle Eastern liberals and the lef t also support the NGOs for their
perceived role as agents of social change from below, contributing ul t imately to devel-
opment and democracy. Thus, for a Palest inian activist , "the most impor tun! role of
NGOs in a future Pa les t in ian se l f -author i ty is to accelerate the speed of change, to
mobilize the rural populution and to democrati/e the society."" Because of their small
si/e, efficiency, and commitment to the cause of the poor, NGOs are seen as true
vehicles for grass roots participation in development. Consequently, (hey serve as a
bulwark against the creeping spread of Islamic fundamentalism by offering an alterna-
tive outlet to the Is lamist agendas.
How e f f e c t i v e are the development and we l f a r e NGOs in lacing the challenge of
social development in the Middle East? Most s tudies confirm that the sector is "a vital
component of the nations' social safety net and important provider of valued social
services."7' In Iraq, Eebunon, Palestine, and Sudan, where the states have been absent.
defunct, or in deep crisis, NGOs play a v i t a l role in survival, emergency aid, und
relief. According to the World Bank, Palestinian NGOs in 1994 accounted for 60
percent of primary health-care services and 50 percent of all secondary and tertiary
health-care services; 100 percent of the programs for the disabled and preschool chil-
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dren; and a si/able portion of agricultural, housing, small business credit, and welfare
services. ' In addition, given the growing pr ivat i /a t ion and high costs of health care
and education, the poorest segments of society would hardly be able to afford their
increasing costs wi thout these associations. In a sense, NGOs assist the declining
public sector on which m i l l i o n s of citizens st i l l rely. In my research in Cairo, for
example, NGOs' premises often served a community funct ion and could be used free
ol charge or for a nominal fee as day-care centers; medical clinics: family-planning
services; recreational and vocational t raining classes in sewing, dollmaking, electrical-
appliance repair; and the like. One association that provides micro-credit loans to
single mothers has made i t possible for hundreds women to set up vending enterprises
in their localities and thereby become functionally self-suff icient . NGOs' headquarters
often served a social funct ion, as well, allowing local poor famil ies , mostly women,
to gather in publ ic and learn social sk i l l s , such as how to t a lk in public or behave
"properly." An est imated 5 mi l l ion poor people benefit from such associations." The
U>00 Egyptian CDAs alone serve some 30().()()() people by implementing programs
in health care, food production, women's projects, f ami ly planning, income genera-
tion, and child and youth development.76
Social development, however, is more than mere survival, relief, and safety net,
with total dependence on charity or precarious foreign aid.77 In addition, in the current
development discourse, social development does not only mean f u l f i l l i n g basic needs;
it also involves achieving social and economic rights and being self-sustaining. This
requires, in Anisur Rahman's words, "creating a condition where people can t h i n k ,
use thei r abil i t ies , and act, that is, to participate."7" Ideally, an "NGO should work so
as to make itself progressively redundant to any group or set of groups with which it
lias been working intensively." In short, they should mobili/e the grass-roots. How
well do the Middle Mastern development NGOs meet this goal of mobili/ation'.'
Many NGO advocates have complained about the absence of a spirit of participa-
tion in the NGOs Despite a recent tendency to establish professional and advocacy
associations. Jordanian NGOs remain largely "charity-driven."7'' Activists hope that
they wil l adopt an "enabling approach.""" Lebanese NGOs s t i l l carry the legacy of
war and are active mainly in the fields of relief anil emergency; l ike (heir Palestinian
counterpar ts , they depend heavily on external h u m a n i t a r i a n assistance. Only recently
has there been a clear sh i f t from relief and humanitarian assistance to the develop-
mental and advocacy associations (human rights, women, and democracy).11' The
( ' h a ï K a b l e Societies in Palestine have managed to alleviate (in the areas of relief,
heal th , education, and culture) the pressure generated by daily needs. They play a
"preventive role at best, by mainta in ing basic social care, but they do not perform a
developmental role in the f u l l sense of the term.' Accordingly. NGOs' overwhelming
focus on services at the cost of ignoring productive activities has pushed the Palestin-
ians toward fu r the r dependence on the Israeli economy.
Several accounts of NGOs—notably, the likes of the traditional welfare associations
in Egypt—point to their largely paternalistic attitudes and structure." Paternalism is
reflected both in local NGOs' top-down internal organi/ation and in thei r re la t ionship
with the beneficiaries. The main decisions in NGOs are made by one or two people.
with rare participation of staff, including the extension workers. In turn, stall are
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motivated not by a l t ru i s t i c incentives hut by monetary motives. With the dearth of
voluntarism, NGO work lor status-conscious but low-paid employees appears to be
no more than a dull job experience.
Paternalistic NGOs perceive their beneficiaries more as recipients of assistance than
as participants in development. For their "favors" and benevolence, N(!()s often ex-
pect loyalty, support, and service. It is not the place of beneficiaries to question the
adequacy and qual i ty of services or the accountability of the NGOs, for this would he-
interpreted as interfering in NGOs' a t t a i r s . It is not the target groups but the NGO
leaders and donors who define the needs and priorities of a given NGO. A common
problem among Middle Eastern NGOs is project duplication, which results not only
from inadequate coordination, but also from ignoring the specific concerns of the
beneficiaries. Competition and factionalism among NGOs, and the variations in do-
nors' (often intermediary NGOs) policies prevent coordination of development strate-
gies and add up to the problem of duplication. Indeed, local associations are often
subjected to cl ientel ist ic relations with the intermediary NGOs, who extend funds to
the former.
The professional NGOs, which have grown exponentially in the 1990s, seem to
have overcome some of the administrative and attitudinal shortcomings of the more
traditional welfare associations. They attempt to practice participatory methods both
internally and in relation to their clients, placing the emphasis on professionalism,
education, and efficiency. A number of women's, human-rights, and advocacy NGOs
reflect this trend today.xs However, certain features ol professional organizations—
hierarchy of authority, fixed procedures, r igidity, and the division of labor—tend to
diminish the spirit of participation. Rima Hammami has shown in the case of Palestine
that local activism and mass organizations betöre the peace process were mostly mobi-
li/ational—that is, the activities were initiated, decided on, and carried out with the
involvement of the grass-roots. After the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was
set up, however, the conditions of foreign funding turned these groups into organiza-
t ions of the professional elite, with particular discourses of efficiency and expertise.
This new arrangement tends to create distance between NGOs and the grass-roots.*"'
Thus, what NGO activism means in reality is the activism of NGO leaders, not that
of the mi l l i ons ot targeted people. These NGOs serve more their employees than the
political beneficiaries.
In addition to the internal problems (paternalism and administrative inadequacy),
government surveillance poses a real obstacle to autonomous and healthy operation
of NGOs. In general, as with the grass-roots associations, states in the region express
a contradictory position toward NGOs: they lend them support as long as the NGOs
reduce the burden of social-service provision and poverty alleviation. In the late 1990s,
recognition was growing among Middle Haslern states of the contributions made by the
voluntary sector in social development, as reflected in new and more favorable NGO
laws and the public expression of support for the organizations (as in Hgypt, Iran, and
Jordan). Yet the governments also fear losing political space, because there is the possi-
bility of NGOs turning oppositional. Professional associations (in Hgypt, Jordan, Pales-
tine and Iran) are often drawn into politics, compensating for the absence or inadequacy
ot |x)litical parties. Consequently, governments, while allowing associational life, im-
pose strict legal control by screening initiators; they also check fund-raising, and unilat-
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erally outlaw nonconformist NGOs. This contradictory position is partly a funct ion
of the states' economic and political capacities—while economic weakness in a coun-
try may unintent ional ly generate space for people's self-activity, the states' political
feebleness usua l ly restrains it. To i l l u s t r a t e , the Iranian government, lacking f inancial
resources to curb population growth in the early 1990s, mobilized more than 20,(X)()
female volunteers who managed educational work to achieve successful family-plan-
ning and primary health-care programs in ci t ies , bringing the growth rate down from
a high 3.4 percent in 1987 to 1.4 percent by 1996. Yet the government fiercely rejected
these women's demand to set up an association because it feared independent organi-
zation.*7 In a way, this implies that in practice the state favors certain NGOs (depend-
ing on what they do) and is leery of others. For instance, associations that belong to
well-connected high officials are treated better than are critical human-rights and
women's rights organizations. It is, therefore, crucial not to approach the NGO sector
as ,in homogenous e n t i t y . Just as with the concept of "civil society," class and connec-
tion intervene to s t ra t i fy the private voluntary sector.
These handicaps are partially cultural and attitudinal (e.g., the paternalistic ap-
proach to development and status orientation) and partly structural. Unlike those of
trade unions and cooperatives, the beneficiaries of NGOs are not its members and
therefore cannot hold it accountable for inadequacy. The same relationship, in turn,
persists between local NGOs and donor agencies; as a result, the NGOs are account-
able not to their beneficiaries but to their donors. Mahmoud Mamdani is perhaps
correct in saying that the NGOs do undermine the exist ing c l i en te l i sm, yet they s imul-
taneously create a new type.9" The question, then, is whether the present NGOs are
structural ly able to foster grass-roots participation for meaningful development. Per-
haps we simply expect too much from NGOs, as Niel Webster, writing on India, has
noted. Maybe we attribute "these NGOs with development qualities and abilities that
they do not in fact possess."" Whatever our expectations, the fact remains that sel l
activity—collective or individual mobilization—remain a crucial factor in poor peo-
ples' elevation to a point at which they can meaningfully manage their own lives In
the Middle East, the existing forms of ac t iv i sm in the communities—or through labor
unions , soc ia l Is lam, and the NGOs—do contribute to the well-being of the underpriv-
ileged groups. However, they fa l l short of activating and directing a great number of
people in sustained mobilization for social development. The socio-political character-
is t ics of the Middle East instead tend to generate a particular form of activism—a
grass-roots non-movement that, I th ink , has far-reaching implications for social
change. I have called this the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary."
T H E Q U I E T h N ( R O A C U M I N I
The notion of "quiet encroachment" describes the silent, protracted, and pervasive
advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in a quest lor survival
and improvement of their l ives. ' They are characteri/ed by quiet, largely atomized,
and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective action—open and fleeting strug-
gles without clear leadership, ideology, or structured organization. Although the quiet
encroachment is basically a non-movement, it is distinct from survival strategies or
"everyday resistance" in that, first, the struggles and gains of the grass roots are at
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the cost nol of fellow poor people or themselves hut of the state, the rieh, and the
general public. In order to light their shelters, the urbun poor tap eleetrieity not from
their neighbors, but from the mun ic ipa l power poles; to raise their l i v ing standard,
they do not prevent their chi ldren from attending school so that they can work but,
rather, reduce the time they spend at their formal jobs to have more time for their
secondary work in the informal sector.
In addition, these struggles should be seen not as necessarily defensive merely in
the realm of resistance but as cumula t ive ly encroaching, meaning that the actors tend
to expand their space by winning new positions to move on. This kind of quiet activ-
ism challenges many fundamental state prerogatives, including the meaning of "or-
der," control of publ ic space, and the meaning of "urban." But the most immediate
consequence is the redis t r ibut ion of social goods in the form of the (unlawful and
direct) acquisition of collective consumption ( land, shelter, piped water, electricity).
public space (street pavement, intersections, street parking places), and oppor tuni t ies
(favorable business conditions, locations, and labels).
Post-Revolution Iran experienced an unprecedented coloni/ation, mostly by the
poor, of pub l ic and p r iva te land, apartments , hotels, street sidewalks, and public u t i l i -
t ies . Between 1980 and 1992. despite the government's opposition, the land area of
Tehran expanded from 200 square kilometers to d()0 square kilometers; well over one
hundred mostly informal communities were created in and around greater Tehran. The
actors of the massive informal economy extended beyond the typical marginal poor
to include the new middle classes, the educated salary-earners whose public-sector
positions rapidly declined during the 1980s. In a more dramatic fashion, mi l l i ons of
rural migrants and the urban poor in Egypt have q u i e t l y claimed cemeteries, rooftops,
and state and public lands on the ou t sk i r t s of the city, creating largely autonomous
communities. Greater Cairo contains more than 1 1 1 '« .V/IHYMVW//, or spontaneous set-
tlements housing more than 6 mill ion people who have subdivided agricultural lands
and put up shelters unlawful ly . Throughout the country, 344 square ki lometers of land
has come under occupation or i l legal construction mainly by low-income groups.
Some 84 percent of all housing units from 1970 and 1981 were informally built. To
these informal units one should add "vertical encroachments"—the addition of rooms,
balconies, and extra space on top of buildings. The capital for construction comes
mainly from the jam'iyyut, informal credit systems located in neighborhoods. Many
rent the homes un lawfu l ly to other poor famil ies . The prospective tenant provides the
"key money," which he borrows from a jama'iyya, to a plot holder, who then uses it
to build but rents it to the provider of the key money. The plot holder becomes a
homeowner, and the tenan t f i n d s a place to live. Both break the law that allows only
one year's advance on rent."
Once settled, the poor tend to force the authorit ies to extend living amenities, or
collective consumption, to their neighborhoods by otherwise tapping them illegally.
Many poor in Tehran, Cairo. Istanbul, Tunisia, and other cities use i l legal running
water and electricity by connecting their homes to electricity poles, extending water
pipes to their domiciles, or sharing or manipulat ing u t i l i t y meters. For instance, illegal
use of piped water in the city of Alexandria alone costs, on average, some $3 mil l ion
a year. A cursory look at Cairo-based communi t ies such as Dar Hssalaam, K/bat Sadat,
I /bat Khei ru l lah , I/bat Nasr. and Basaatin show evidence of this widespread phenome-
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MOM. In late April 1996, the municipality reported that it had cut off 800 illegal elec-
tricity lines in the Dar Essalaam and Basaatin communities in a single raid.
This informal and often uncharged use of collective services leaves governments
l i t t l e choice but selectively to integrate the informal settlements, hoping to commit
the residents to pay for services they have thus far used illegally. Securing property
and community tax is another consideration. Although the poor welcome the extension
of provisions, they often cannot afford to pay the bills. Therefore, it is not uncommon
to see reinformali/.ation springing up from the fringes of the new formali/ed commu-
nit ies (as in Tehran's Islamshahr and Cairo's I/bat al-Hajjana).
In the domain of work, "street subsistence workers" quietly take over public thor-
oughfares to conduct their business on the vast parallel economy. The streets in the
commercial districts of Middle Eastern cities are colonized by street vendors who
encroach on favorable business opportunities that shopkeepers have created. Cairo
reportedly has 600,000 street vendors, and Tehran, unti l recently, had some 150,000.
Informality means not only that the actors generally escape the costs of formality (tax
regula t ion , for instance) but that they also benefit from the theft of imported goods,
brands, and intellectual property. With capital of $6, a Cairene vendor can make up
to $55 a month.'"
Thousands of poor (in Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran, for instance) subsist on t ips
from |iarking cars in the streets that they control and organize in such a way as to
create maximum parking space. They have turned many streets into vir tual parking
lots, which they privately control by creating working gangs with elaborate internal
organi/.ation. Establishing alternative transportation systems is another way to make
a l iv ing. I/bat Khairullah in Cairo typifies thousands of similar neighborhoods in the
region, where vans carry passengers without even registration plates. A newspaper
described th is community as one in which "no official has ever entered since its
establishment" in the early 1980§.M The logic behind these types of encroachment is
reflected in the words of a Cairene street vendor, who said. "When dealing with the
government, you have to take the proverb, 'What you can win with, play with. '"
Governments usual ly send mixed signals about quiet encroachment. On the one
hand, they see the people helping themselves by building their own shelters, getting
their own services, creating their own jobs. On the other hand, they realize that these
ac t iv i t i e s are carried out largely at the cost of the stale, the propertied, and the public.
Equal ly important, the poor tend to out-adminis ter the authorities by establishing a
different public order, acting independently and often tarnishing the image of moder-
nity the nation seeks to portray. "We are not against the vendors making a living,"
says the chief of Cairo's security department, "but not at the expense of Egypt's
reputation. They spoil the picture of Cairo, they block the streets, they crowd the
pavements."'''
Yet encroachment is tolerated in practice as long as it appears limited. But once it
goes too far. governments often react. Post-Revolutionary Iran, for instance, saw many
bloody confrontations between the security forces and encroachers. Daily police ha-
rassment is a common practice in many Middle Eastern ci t ies . Nevertheless, the fre-
quent offensives against squatters and street vendors often t a i l to bring a result. The
actors either resort to on-the-spot resistance (as in Iran) or, more commonly, resume
their activities quietly following each tactical retreat (as in Egypt). For instance, while
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the municipal police drive around to remove street vendors—in which case the ven-
dors suddenly disappear—the vendors normally return to their work once the police
are gone. "Everything we are doing is useless." says an Egyptian official.''* The Iranian
authorities became even more frustrated when "anti-vending squads" failed to clear
public spaces. Confronting quiet encroachment is particularly d i f f i c u l t for vulnerable
governments. The municipalit ies, us ing stick-and-carrol tactics, may indeed manage
to demolish communities, drive vendors away from the main streets, or track down
unregistered transportation. Nevertheless, they have to yield to the actors' demands
by offering alternative solutions Where removals or demolitions have actually been
carried out, the dispossessed have been offered alternative street markets, housing, or
regulated taxi service. Only 13 of a total K I squatter settlements in Cairo (excluding
( i u i / a ) have been identified for demolition (for safety reasons); the rest are planned
to be upgraded.9*'
Quiet encroachment, therefore, is not a politics of collective demand-making, a
politics of protest. Rather, it is a mix of individual and collective direct action. It is
accentuated under the socio-political circumstance characterized by authoritarian
slates, populist ideology, and strong family ties. The authoritarian bureaucratic stales
make collective demand-making both risky (because ol repression) and less than e l l ec -
tive (owing to bureaucratic inefficiency); populism tends to obstruct the public sphere
and autonomous collectivities, rendering primary loyalties the more functional mecha-
nism of survival and struggle. Yet, in the long run, the encroachment strategy gener-
ates a reality on the ground with which states often find no option but to come to
terms. In the end, the poor manage to bring about significant changes in their own
lives, the urban structure, and social policy. It is precisely t h i s centrality ol ' the agency,
of the urban grass-roots, that distinguishes quiet encroachment from any incremental
social change that may result from urbani/ation in general.
Although this kind of activism represents a life-long, sustained, and self-generating
advance, it is largely unlawful and constantly involves risk of harassment, insecurity,
and repression. As f lu id and unstructured forms of activism, encroachment has the
advantage of f l ex ib i l i ty and versatility, but it falls short of developing legal, financial,
organi/ational, and even moral support. The challenge is to encourage convergence
of the mobili/ational element of quiet encroachment, the ins t i t u t iona l capacity of
NGOs, and the consent of the authorities. The Street Food Vendors' Orgam/ation
(SI-'VO) in the Egyptian city of Minia displays such a possibility. A number of NGO
activists helped 700 vendors organi/e and gain the support of the local au thor i t i e s .
Once it was set up, the SFVO launched a credit fund, improved hygiene, introduced
bulk purchase of foodstuffs, provided group health insurance, helped to ease registra-
t ion in the state bureaucracy, and eliminated police harassment. This successful exper-
iment has encouraged other cities to take similar initiatives."1"
Yet the poor's encroachment on the propertied and powerful, the public, and the
state is surely not unlimited. The grass-roots might be able to secure many necessary
provisions, jobs, and urban services—and these are certainly crucial. But how can
they at tain schools, public parks, health insurance, and security at home and work.
which are linked to the larger structures and processes'.' One should perhaps begin by
recogni/ing both the potential and the l imi t a t i ons of grass-roots ac t iv i sm, as well as
state involvement in redistribution matters at a large scale.
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CONCLUSIONS
Early reaction by the urban grass-roots to aspects of ERSA policies during the 1980s
included developing coping strategies and mounting urban riots. These strategics,
however, seem to have given way to more institutionali/ed methods of dealing with
austerity. The safety nets provided by social Islam and NGOs (coupled with state
repression) contributed to th i s shift in method. With political Islam undermined (in-
st i (ut ional i /ed, co-opted, or curbed) by the end of the 1990s, social Islam, "NGO-
ization," and quiet encroachment, despite their flaws, appear to have become the
dominant forms of activism that now contribute to improving some aspects of people's
lives in Middle Eastern countries. Although quiet encroachment has a longer history,
the spread of Is lamism and NGOs gained new momentum in the 1980s and especially
in the 1990s, the period in which neo-liberal economic policies began to be imple-
mented. The growth of these types of activism (along with the new social movements
associated with women and human rights) coincides with the relative decline in tradi-
tional class-based movements—peasant organizations, cooperative movements, and
trade unionism. The transformation of the rural social structure, "de-peasantiz.ation,"
and growing urbanization are eroding the social bases of peasant and cooperative
movements. The weakening of economic populism, closely linked to the new eco-
nomic restructuring, has resulted in a decline of public-sector employment, which
constituted the core of the corporatist trade unionism; at the same time, it has led to
a growing fragmentation of the workforce, expressed in the expansion of the informal
urban economy. State bureaucracy (as a segment of the publ ic sector) continues to
remain weighty; however, its employees, unlike workers in industry or services,
hugely have been unorganized. A large segment of low-paid state employees survive
on incomes deriving trom second or third jobs in the informal sector.
In the meantime, the increasing informality of economies and expanded urbaniza-
tion in the Middle East tend to cause a shift in popular needs and demands. The
growth of informali ty means that struggles for wages and conditions, the typical focus
of traditional trade un ion i sm, are losing ground in favor of broader concerns for jobs,
informal work conditions, anil affordable cost of living. Rapid urbanizat ion, however,
increases the demand for urban collective consumption—shelter, decent housing, elec-
tricity, piped water, transportation, health care, and education. This desire for citizen-
ship , expressed in community membership and developmental rights, is one that tradi-
tional trade unionism is unable to address. The task instead fal ls on community
movements that remain feeble in the Middle East. However, the scope of social Islam
and NGOs, despite their contributions to social welfare, is also unable to realize fu l ly
the goal of social development. By the close of the 1990s, some Middle Eastern
governments were cautiously recognizing the activities of some civil-society organiza-
tions, especially the social-development NGOs. New NGO laws in Egypt and Pales-
tine, public expression of more positive attitudes in Jordan, and the support given by
iv lo rmis i President Khatami to popular participation in Iran demonstrate some change
of attitude. Yet these measures fall short of empowering civil-society organizations
from above and encouraging social development from below. It is, therefore, mainly
to the strategy of quiet encroachment that the urban grass roots in the Middle East
resort in order to f u l f i l l their growing needs.
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Thus emerges a salient feature of grass-roots activism in the region: it is character-
i/.ed less by demand-making movements than by direct actions, be they individual,
informal, or ins t i tu t ional . Hence, largely because of the i n e f f i c i e n t and authoritarian
nature of states, people are less inc l ined to get together to demand housing, than to
acquire that housing directly. Similarly, Mosque Associations, instead of mobili/.ing
people to demand welfare from the state, attempt to supply the services directly. Oth-
erwise, people exert collective pressure when their already acquired gains are threat-
ened. In this process, the intervention of advocacy NGOs (such as those for human
rights, women, or democracy) to publicize the cause of the grass-roots often contrib-
utes s ign i f i can t ly to their struggles.
These claim-making acts, collective or individual, have both practical and policy
implications. Through direct actions, the grass-roots and their middle-class supporters
make themselves heard; they create realities on the ground wi th which the authorit ies
sooner or later must come to terms."" Joan Nelson's contention that, because the poor
are never organi/ed well enough, they fail to exert influence on national policies is
true."1' Yet the cumulative consequence of poor people's individual direct actions may,
in the end, result in some improvements f rom below and policy changes from above. In
short, pressure from below in the experience of the Middle East is highly relevant to
social development. Given the gradual retreat of states from their responsibilities in
offer ing social welfare, the poor in the Middle liast would have been in a far worse-
condition had grass-roots actions been totally absent. Yet grass-roots activities do have
limitations in terms of their own internal constraints, their capacity to win concessions
adequately, and in relations to the constraints directed from the states. It is a mistake to
leave the entire task of social development to initiatives trom below; a bigger mistake
is to give up on the states—in particular, on their crucial role in large-scale distribution.
Yet imagining policy change and the concrete improvement of people's lives without
their pressure or direct action seems no more than an unwarranted illusion.
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